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3Abstract
Huge variations exist in the relationships between politicians  and agencies
in Britain, from very frequent contact in a politicised atmosphere to the
complete absence of a direct relationship at all. The nature of the
relationship appears to be determined less by agency status as such as by
the political sensitivity of particular policy issues. While politicians are not
involved in the day-to-day running of most agencies, they have been
concerned with operational matters in a small number of agencies. While
many agencies have no direct input into policy issues (and there are few
directly concerning them), in a limited number of cases the agency is the
main source of policy advice because it is the repository of expertise, and
in others the agency has the right to be consulted about any policy
proposals affecting them, and to make policy proposals. The British Next
Steps agency form, because of it relatively informal status, is relatively
adaptable to new purposes. Thus, agency status as such has provided little
hindrance to the new Labour government. Similarly, while agencies were
originally set up and largely operate with a vertical perspective on meeting
their own targets, the form is adaptable to cross-organisational targets,
though it cannot solve conflicting objectives or policies.
1Introduction
This paper assesses the impact of the development of Next Steps agencies
in Britain since 1988 on a number of the themes of the workshop. The
distinctive features of the British system and these developments are set
out to assist comparison. Among the themes covered are:
• Does agencification remove the day-to-day involvement of elected
ministers?
• How has the issue of policy advice relating to agency programmes been
handled?
• What is the relationship between managers in agencies and other civil
servants in the host department and core executive departments?
• Has agencification limited the capacity of the new Labour government
to carry out policy change?
• What are the implication of agencification for the debate in Britain
about joined up government?
Background: The development of agencies in context
This brief section is designed to set out the development and
characteristics of Next Steps agencies in British government for those who
are unfamiliar with the details. It also attempts to set this development in
the context of other changes in public bureaucracy in Britain, since the
implications of Next Steps agencies, including those for accountability, are
often discussed in isolation from the implications of those other
developments.
On 18 February 1988, Mrs Thatcher, the then British Prime
Minister, announced her acceptance of a report produced by the efficiency
unit within the Cabinet Office, Improving Management in Government:
The Next Steps (The Ibbs Report, 1988), which, she stated, ‘recommended
that to the greatest extent practicable the executive functions of
government, as distinct from policy advice, should be carried out by units
clearly designated within Departments, referred to as “agencies”’ (House
of Commons Debates, 18 February 1988, column 1149).
The data shown in Table 1 would appear to indicate that the agency
initiative has been a resounding success, with 77 per cent of UK civil
servants now in agencies or ‘working on Next Steps lines’. It is worth
noting that although the net number of agencies and their share of civil
servants continued to grow after 1995, the number of staff in agencies did
not rise overall, and actually fell between 1997 and 1998, reflecting civil
service reductions overall, and in many agencies, as well as the
privatisation of agencies. The process of establishing new agencies is still
2not complete at the end of 1998, despite being supposed to be complete by
1993. The candidates for newly established agencies are largely in the
Northern Ireland Civil Service and the Ministry of Defence, neither of
which appear to have been the targets of the original initiative. Agencies
have now been established sufficiently long that they are routinely subject
to organisational succession in the form of privatisations, splittings, and
mergers; this makes the process of trying to track the process of agency
formation by body count complex, since the totals may contain different
sets of organisations.
One important point to stress, since it is sometimes the source of
misunderstanding, is that staff of agencies remain civil servants and also
part of their department, except for those agencies which were already
separate non-ministerial departments. A distinctively British feature is that
the establishment of agencies, both in terms of the general principle and
individual agencies, does not require any legislative action, even
secondary legislation.
Table 1 The development of Next Steps agencies
UK civil servants
Year
(April)
Number of
UK agenciesIn agencies
Including
‘Next Steps’
lines
As % of all
UK civil
servants
1989 3 5,800 5,800 1
1990 26 60,800 60,800 11
1991 48 177,000 204,000 37
1992 66 197,000 287,000 51
1993 82 249,000 335,000 60
1994 91 252,000 334,000 63
1995 97 277,000 357,000 68
1996 102 275,000 350,000 71
1997 110 286,000 364,000 77
1998 112 277,000 356,000 77
3The implication of Mrs Thatcher’s February 1998 statement
appeared to be that the structure of government was to move from an old
pattern of monolithic departments with no clear separation of policy and
executive functions, in which ministers were responsible for all activities,
however detailed, to a new standard pattern of small policy cores with
nearly all executive activities carried out by agencies within departments,
and with ministers not responsible for day-to-day operational decisions.
The acceptance of these before and after patterns is implicit in the early
academic critiques voicing concern about the implications of the Next
Steps initiative for ministerial responsibility for the actions of their
departments (see e.g. Drewry, 1990).
However, the view that the Next Steps initiative has entailed a move
away from a previous standard monolithic pattern to a new simple core-
agency pattern can be challenged. A monolithic pattern is a grossly
inadequate characterisation of how the functions of central government
were delivered prior to 1988, and the pattern which applies as the launch
of new agencies nears completion has so many variations that a simple
core-agency characterisation is insufficient. There are three main issues
here (following Hogwood, 1995):
1. The pre-1988 picture was not one of standard monolithic departments,
which were the exception rather than the rule. One-quarter of the civil
service were in non-ministerial departments (some of which are now also
agencies), and many ministerial departments had distinct organisational
units within them. A further quarter of the civil service was in the Ministry
of Defence, with its distinctive intertwining of civil service and military
staff at all levels.
2. The process of organisational change in British central government
since 1988 cannot be adequately characterised as the identification of
policy advice cores with all executive functions then being assigned to
agencies. The establishment of Next Steps agencies was only one of the
many forms utilised by government in undertaking organisational change
in the means of policy delivery. Others have included the use of statutory
non-departmental public bodies, regulators of privatised industries with the
status of non-ministerial departments, and the use made of nominally
private or voluntary organisations for policy delivery.
3. The prospective pattern on completion of the Next Steps initiative is not
one of policy advice cores with all central government executive actions
being performed through Next Steps agencies. Rather, there are immense
variations in the extent to which the residual department can be considered
to be limited to a policy advice core as implied in Mrs Thatcher’s
statement, and in the extent to which separately identifiable units engaged
in delivery take the form of Next Steps agencies. For example, the
4Department of Social Security has over 84,000 of its 87,000 staff in
agencies (96.8 per cent) but sponsors only three non-departmental public
bodies with a total staff of 100. By contrast, the Department of Culture,
Media and Sport has only one agency, employing 231 out of its 612 staff,
but sponsors 37 non-departmental public bodies, with a total staff of
12,400. The debate about accountability of agencies to ministers often
focuses on the bilateral link between an agency and the minister, but
clearly the relationship between agencies and ministers is bound to be
different in a department with 44 agencies (Defence), compared to a
department with only one, which is engaged in a core activity (the
Employment Service in the Department for Education and Employment).
The standard Next Steps model
Executive Agencies are based upon a nominal separation of policy and
‘operational matters’ within departments. The government accepted the
Ibbs Report recommendation that ‘agencies should be established to carry
out the executive functions of government within a policy and resources
framework set by a department’ (Ibbs Report 1988, 9). The clear
assumption was that:
The main strategic control must lie with the Minister and Permanent Secretary.
But once the policy objectives and budgets within the framework are set, the
management of the agency should have as much independence as possible in
deciding how these objectives are met ... the presumption must be that,
provided management is operating within the strategic direction set by
ministers, it must be left as free as possible to manage within that framework.
(Ibbs Report 1988, 9)
The idea behind Next Steps is, thus, in Peter Kemp’s words,
‘essentially a most simple concept, in some ways almost naive’ (HC 313-
III 1996, 107). Or as Derek Lewis put it more graphically, the concept of
agency status ‘is not rocket science, it is very simple basic management
principles’ (HC 313-III 1996, 94, q. 606). Agencies are simply
administrative arrangements within departments, the functions exercised
by agencies are vested in the department and not in the agency itself, so
that the division of responsibilities between agencies and departments is
determined by the Framework Document and not by statute (see HC 313-
II 1996, 35).
The staff of agencies are still civil servants, working under civil
service terms and conditions, financed by public finances and accountable
through ministers to Parliament (Kemp in HC 313-III 1996, 107) - with the
non-trivial exceptions of military and other civil staff who also work in
agencies, an element ignored in confining the agency debate to questions
5of ministerial civil service relations. The delegation of tasks, and the extent
of managerial devolution to the chief executive is outlined in the
Framework Document. The officially proclaimed expectation is that once
authority has been delegated ministers effectively ‘withdraw’ from
operational matters – the daily, routine matters that have no general policy
implications (Brazier in HC 313-II, 1996, 11). In this sense there would be
a ‘depoliticisation’ of operational matters, but the extent of depoliticisation
is limited in practice by the overarching accountability of ministers to
Parliament.
In addition to the initial Framework Document, agencies are subject
to a five-year cycle of ‘Prior Options’ reviews, so called because they
include consideration of whether the activity should continue at all, be
privatised, or organised in a different way. If the decision is to continue the
activity as an agency, a new Framework Document is prepared.
There are also annual corporate plans, some of which are kept
confidential to the agency and its department for commercial reasons, and
annual reports laid before Parliament. An important annual element is the
setting of targets for performance indicators, with the results being
published in the consolidated annual Next Steps Review.
So the officially proclaimed model is one of separation of policy and
execution, operation within a Framework Document which specifies the
roles of minister, main department and agency chief executive, and
reporting on annual targets. Within that the chief executive is supposed to
have operational autonomy, subject to the important caveat of continuing
ministerial responsibility. The remainder of the paper explores the extent
to which this model applies in practice.
Ministerial involvement in agencies
One crucial link in the chain of accountability is that between the minister
and the agency. One indicator of such involvement is frequency of
meetings between Chief Executive and Secretary of State (see Hogwood,
Judge and McVicar, 1998, Appendix 1, final column). The variations are
extreme, with 43 meetings in the case of the Prison Service, but no
meetings in the case of many agencies. There are also variations in the
extent to which agency chief executives may participate in weekly
meetings of all senior civil servants in a department with ministers.
There are also structural differences in approach arising from the
differing status of agencies. Some agencies, such as Companies House, do
not formally report through civil servants in the minister’s main
department, but direct to the minister. This affords them the same status as
other non-ministerial departments, such as the Charities Commission and
6the Office for Standards in Education. Other large agencies report through
the Permanent Secretary, while smaller agencies may have as their primary
contact either a lower rank civil servant or a departmental board. For the
agencies associated with the Ministry of Defence there is a specified chain
of command which often involves military officers, and through which
agencies, large and small, report.
The handling of replies to parliamentary questions provides another
indication of the variability in procedures affecting ministers and agencies
(see list in HC 313-I 1996, p.xliii). Tony Wright’s researches into whether
ministers had amended replies from chief executives revealed ‘a sort of
pick-and-mix system, some had, some had not, some had large figures,
some had small figures’ (HC 313-III 1996, p. 160, q 930). What he sought
to discover, as ‘a basic point about accountability’, was ‘who owns the
answers?’. The response is that at one end of the spectrum there are those
agencies where PQs are answered exclusively by the chief executive and
which are unseen by ministers prior to finalisation (Northern Ireland); and,
at the other end, there are those agencies in which ministers routinely
‘approve’ the replies of chief executives (Transport). However, the
difference in formally stated practice IS among ministerial departments.
For most, the standard practice is that the minister may see a copy but
would not normally intervene (HC 313-I 1996, p.xliii). There is no
evidence of different treatment in practice within a department according
to agency characteristics or visibility. There is neither a standard
constitutional practice about the role of ministers in relation to chief
executives in accounting for operational matters, nor a systematic attempt
to structure such relationships on the basis of special characteristics or
sensitivities of individual agencies.
The Prison Service scored highest on many indicators of
Parliamentary interest (Judge, Hogwood and McVicar, 1997). It also
provides an extreme and untypical example of involvement by the minister,
with the two forms of interest being clearly related The formally-stated
position of the Prison Service is that it is structured so that the principal
responsibility for prison policy  rests with the Home Office.  Prison
management is the responsibility of the Director General, the Prisons
Board and individual prison managers (Cooper, 1995, p.141).  The
concept of the division of labour is the inspiration behind entire Next Steps
initiative.  However, the Home Office has traditionally been closely
involved in Prison Service operational matters, contributing to a culture in
which Departmental interference has become the norm (Talbot, 1995).
The absence of a Home Office corporate plan to set out strategy
means that, in practice, the Director General has the role of attempting to
specify prison policy, subject to various political and public pressures.
7The Director General is open to enquiries from Ministers, MPs and
Parliamentary Questions. In Learmont's view, this takes up a ‘detrimental’
amount of time. Indeed, the amount of paperwork throughout the service is
judged to have reached 'epidemic proportions' (p.166).
The Prison Services Framework Document specifies the role to be
played by the Home Secretary:
The Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament for the Prison Service.  The
Home Secretary allocates resources to the Prison service and approves its
Corporate and Business Plans, including its key targets.
But the Framework Document is vague in the delineation of responsibility:
The Home Secretary will not normally become involved in the day-to-day
management of the Prison service but will expect to be consulted by the
Director General on the handling of operational matters which could give rise
to grave public or Parliamentary concern.
In Talbot’s view, this allows the Home Secretary an important formal
influence over operational matters as well as policy (1995, 17).  For
example, evidence submitted reveals that the Direct General's answers to
MPs questions are cleared with Ministers.  Shortly after his dismissal (an
example of ‘sacrificial’ responsibility), Derek Lewis complained in
interview:
Agency status was intended to bring greater operational autonomy to the
prison service.  This clearly has not happened.  There are many observers who
now consider the Prison Service to have less autonomy than it did pre-Agency
status.  There has been very close Ministerial involvement in and scrutiny of
operational decisions (Newsnight 16/10/95, quoted in Talbot, 1995, 17).
Of course, the Prison Service is politically salient - sensitive and central to
the Department. It is a core service, comprising nearly 80 per cent of
Home Office staff. It is large in overall governmental terms, both in
relation to staffing and finance. However, the evidence presented to the
Learmont Inquiry indicate that the organisation suffered from pathological
accountability - where management was forced to donate a
disproportionate effort to meeting its responsibility to be 'accountable'
(Learmont, 1995). Learmont recorded over 1000 pieces of correspondence
between the Prison Service and the Home Office during a four month
period, October 1994 to January 1995, 137 of which were ‘substantive’.
The Director General in particular is open to enquiries from Ministers,
MPs and Parliamentary Questions.  In Learmont's view, this takes up a
8‘detrimental’ amount of time. Indeed, the amount of paperwork throughout
the service is judged to have reached 'epidemic proportions' (p.166). The
inquiry concluded that upwards communication had become the 'raison
d'être' of Prison Service headquarters and that a more balanced approach
was needed. In particular a balance needed to be struck between informing
ministers and managing the Service (Recommendation 70).
Apart from the extreme case of the Prisons Service,  there is
substantial variation in patterns of ministerial involvement. We can
distinguish in principle between underlying patterns and those associated
with particular issues or events. A string of events and issues may lead to a
longer term pattern of contact between agency executives and ministers.
For example, the Meat Hygiene Service was different from most agencies
in that it was not simply an existing civil service activity separated out into
an agency. Problems with its establishment, and subsequently the BSE
crisis, e-coli outbreaks in Scotland, and Labour’s commitment to a Food
Standards Agency, meant a high frequency of contact between the chief
executive and ministers at all levels within the department. Other
executives might be involved on relevant matters; for example, the finance
director had several meetings within one month on issues concerning
charging.
For other agencies, including many in the Ministry of Defence, there
would be very little ministerial involvement, except when there was a high
profile issue like announcing a market test or a workshop closure, where
the need to refer the matter to the minister’s office would lead to delays.
The key determinant of the extent of ministerial i volvement
appears to be the political sensitivity of the work of the agency, rather than
agency status as such. For some, such as the Prison Service, the
involvement is almost constant. For some others, such as the Child
Support Agency, it is cyclical, and for others, such as the Meat Hygiene
Service, a crisis and an upsurge of political involvement can lead to greater
ministerial involvement.
Policy and agencies
If continuing involvement of ministers in the day-to-day affairs continues
for a limited number of agencies, it is worth considering whether the other
side of the official Next Steps coin applies: are policy matters solely a
matter for the core of ministerial departments? The answer is that while for
a large number of relatively technical or support agencies there is little or
no policy input by agencies, largely because there are few policy
consideration directly relating to them. However, some agencies do have a
formal policy role.
9At one extreme there is the Pesticides Safety Directorate, which h s
as one of its functions defined in its framework agreement to ‘develop
policy on pesticides and plant protection and advise the Minister
accordingly’. This reflects the fact that all the expertise of the department
on pesticides is now concentrated in the agency. This raises a broader
issue of how ministers and departments are able to evaluate policy advice
coming from the body responsible for implementation, particularly in the
light of the reductions in the core of some departments.
There is a particular issue concerning non-ministerial departments,
that is departments headed by a director or board of officials and reporting
to Parliament through the minister, but not through the officials of his main
ministerial department. Some of these non-ministerial departments are also
agencies. Civil servants in the ministers main department are traditionally
reluctant to comment to ministers on matters affecting non-ministerial
departments. This can lead to perceived gaps as in the National Audit
Office criticisms of the privatisation of HMSO, a non-ministerial
department and agency.
A more common form of involving agencies in policy is reflected in
the Employment Service framework document:
The Chief Executive may make proposals to the Secretary of State for changes
in the policies and programmes operated by the Agency, consulting the
Permanent Secretary of the Employment Department Group to ensure that they
are consistent with the overall policy objectives of the Group. The Chief
Executive is a member of the appropriate senior Employment Department
Group committees and in that capacity participates in discussions about its
overall policy.
Here the chief executive is very much part of the senior management and
policy team of the department (now the Department for Education and
Employment).
Managers and managers
The workshop outline refers to the relationship between politicians and
managers in agencies. Our research has shown that for many chief
executives the relationship between ministers (even if this is expanded to
include the ministers’ offices) and chief executives is minimal to non-
existent. This appears to raise interesting questions about accountability.
However, our research has also shown that all agencies (and non-
departmental public bodies) are subject to a wide range of forms of
scrutiny by civil servants both in the host department and those in the
Cabinet Office or Treasury concerned with system-wide issues, to the
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extent that some agencies regarded these pressures as undermining the
managerial autonomy the agency model should have given them (see
Hogwood, Judge and McVicar, 1998)
A key source of pressure comes in the form of departmental
requests for information. It is in this area that we found most of the main
complaints about accountability overload. This did not focus on ministerial
involvement (indeed, most recognised that agencies must be able to
respond to immediate requests for information by ministers). Given the
experiences of Derek Lewis and Michael Howard, we might have
expected to find more sources of tension, but the following view was
typical:
The Minister has to be kept informed of things that may affect him, of
questions that may come up in the House ... there is a need to protect the
Minister - in a sense to do work for the Minister.
Such a philosophical approach was not extended to the relationship
between departments and some (although not all) of our selected
organisations. The following provide examples of typical grievances and
complaints:
The provision of information is becoming an increasing requirement. The
department that has had the largest increase in staff numbers has been the
operations department - purely to meet this increase in information need. It’s
very serious...It’s the old story. You provide information and people either
disagree with it or ask questions about it and the whole thing snowballs. I’ve
never comes across in life so many bits of paper and the need to supply so
much information. You get buried with the damn stuff. My in-tray is full and,
each day, I get around 40 e-mails ... you develop a technique and you just have
to deal with the most important bits. (Agricultural Next Steps agency
concerned with regulation)
I am very much aware that we have targets, and I spend a very large part of my
time ensuring that we are actually meeting these targets ... that is a very
important part of my job but I’m not able to go and talk to my more junior staff
and see how they are getting on. I am not as aware of the progress of
individual bits of [the organisation] as I would like because I am saying: ‘how’s
the money doing’ and ‘are we on track’? (Next Steps agency concerned with
research)
A number of officers commented that they had been disappointed
with agency status and the lack of autonomy:
My understanding of agency status was that you would have a certain amount
of autonomy to get on and run the business. That seems to be less and less ...
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and increasingly they seem to be more prescriptive. We can actually do things
much more efficiently if we are allowed to get on and do it but, because
everything is so regimented and regulated, it actually makes it more inefficient
and time-consuming. The amount of paper work I have to fill in ... (Small Next
Steps Agency providing fringe service)
I think it’s contrary to what the Next Steps agency process should be all about.
I mean, we are monitored by our performance targets, we’re audited financially
and technically. Next Steps agencies were created to be detached, autonomous,
self-standing units who could be monitored from a distance and left to get on
it. We are not left to get on with it. There’s a lot of interference in terms of
form-filling. (Agricultural Next Steps Agency concerned with regulation)
Repetition of requests for information was a particular sou ce of
grievance.
A major source of resentment reported to us by our interviewees
comes in the form of departmental-wide information-gathering exercises.
Pressures apply to small as well as large agencies and sometimes impacts
on smaller bodies more directly, as they have to take part in these
department-wide surveys and requests for information while having
relatively few resources (in terms of staff) to devote:
I think quite a bit of it is unnecessary. I get quite frustrated that we have to fill
in our respective part of major departmental reports, or the Next Steps Agency
Review. Does anybody read these bloody things? And there’s all sorts of really
stupid forms we have to fill ... a lot of routine stuff I have always been dubious
about the value of. (Agricultural Next Steps Agency concerned with
regulation)
Financial accountability also provides examples of information
demands on an organisation. Next Steps agencies vary along the whole
range of funding, from 100 per cent government funding of their activities
to fully covering all their costs from fees or charges. Related to this is the
difference in trading terms, with some agencies (such as Welsh Historic
Monuments, CADW) being Supply financed and required to pay any
income into general government funds, some (such as the Vehicle
Certification Agency) are Supply financed but operated on a ‘net running
costs regime’, while others have trading fund status, which enables them
to offset expenditure. Some agencies, which are non-ministerial
departments in their own right, can bid direct to the Treasury for funding.
Traditional models of financial accountability assume only the first type of
funding.
The mechanics of financial accountability are, therefore, an
important aspect of agency relations with the core department and the
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Treasury. Each agency (and other body) is, through ministers, responsible
for its expenditure. In the case of Next Steps agencies, each is required to
produce an annual report with audited accounts which are laid before
Parliament. Most also produce publicly-available corporate plans (except
in agencies where to do so would be commercially detrimental). It is clear
from our research that the degree of core-department involvement and
interference in financial matters is inconsistent. Some agencies reported
little contact with the department on a financial level, beyond basic
reporting (which can be conducted on monthly basis as well as quarterly
and annually). Others were not so fortunate.
Recognition of financial accounting pressures a  ‘pathological’
were, not unnaturally, more often expressed by finance directors than chief
executives. The general pattern was that requests for financial information
were a reflection of the general agency relationship with the core
department. A few of the bodies we spoke to revealed particular
difficulties, related to government accounting techniques and Treasury
clawback of ‘excessive’ income:
To spend to budget, is fine. But to underspend, in some respects raises
questions. Although we are an agency, about 30 per cent of our business is
commercial. In terms of accountability, this is a key issue. The [department], to
be quite blunt about it, have no idea. These guys have worked in the civil
service their entire careers, they have a very conventional outlook based on the
Vote and they have a simplistic way of adding up numbers and a general
misunderstanding of needs of a business. We have to be flexible and adaptive
but we also have to meet all the criteria of government accounting ... In terms
of accountability, with 30 per cent of our business commercial, I feel that only
70 per cent of the accountability is understood by those who monitor our
affairs. They do see things in simple terms. We, as an agency carry quite a
substantial EYF (end year flexibility) and we need approval to roll money over
to the next financial year. Instead of that being accepted as ‘you’ve generated
the money, you have good reasons for needing it the following year’ ... each
year we have to argue the same case with the Department as to why we have
this money. There is no chance of a learning curve with the Department
because they keep changing the staff. (A heritage Next Steps agency)
Partly as a response to the accounting requirements of core
departments, many agencies and non-agencies also operate extensive
models of internal financial accountability within their own organisation.
These too can be pathological in their impact: ‘we have internal
accountability which also takes up a lot of time. I won’t say it duplicates
but supplements all the other types of recording we have to do’ (heritage
NDPB). However, as one of the Trading Fund agencies argued: ‘unless
you’re a Trading Fund, you’re only playing at it’.
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Problems were reported by a number of bodies which have
experienced an overload of government accounting requirements and
general scrutinies, such as ‘prior options’, ‘quinquennial reviews’, ‘market
testing’. These were identified as pathological pressures, unrelated to the
specific need to be accountable, but still department-enforced. More
generally, the multiplicity of volumes of guidance was seen as difficult or
impossible to fulfil:
Has agencification limited the capacity of the new Labour government
to carry out policy change?
This section uses number of examples of policies of the new government
involving organisational change to explore whether the Next Steps agency
form acted as a hindrance to the capacity of the new Labour government to
carry out policy change. It might appear that with five-year framework
agreements and annual plans and targets there might be expected to be a
delay in being able to follow through policy change.
The first example provides evidence that the agency form does not
necessarily provide a hindrance. The ‘New Deal for the Unemployed’
involving training and job placement for (initially young) unemployed was
a flagship manifesto policy of the Labour Party, to be funded by a special
‘windfall’ tax on privatised utilities (details are available at
http://www.newdeal.gov.uk/) . The Employment Service
agency, far from seeking to hinder the introduction of the programme,
eagerly and successfully seized the opportunity to try to become the lead
player, a role which was confirmed for it  A revised operational plan for
the Employment service for 1997-98 to take into account the priorities of
the new government was published on 30 July 1998 (Employment Service
Press Release 04/97). In other words, given the lack of legal status to the
annual plans and agreements, they can simply be torn up and new ones
issued.
Of course, an agency might be expected to be cooperative over a
programme which provides more funding opportunities. The saga of the
Food Standards Agency might appear to provide a counter-example, since
it has still not been established nor has legislation been introduced. The
political background includes the BSE crisis and Labour criticisms of the
previous government over this, as well as a fatal outbreak of e-coli food
poisoning. The proposed remit covers the concerns of two main
departments Health and Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (plus
Scottish and Welsh ones) and relates to the activities of a number of
existing agencies. However, the main reasons for the delay do not appear
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to be obstruction by existing Next Steps agencies (at least according to our
interview at the Meat Hygiene Service). Rather the delays spring from:
(a) the inherent complexity of the subject and the ambiguity of the
boundaries of food standards (should it include dietary advice, for
example);
(b) the expected turf war between Health and MAFF, the latter having in
the past played the lead role on food safety and likely to lose it;
(c) the desire of the Labour government to set up the Food Standards
Agency not as a Next Steps Agency but to entrench it as a statutory body
with an independent board.
In his budget speech on 17 March 1998 the Chancellor of the
Exchequer announced that the Contributions Agency, which collects social
security contributions would transfer from the Department of Social
Security to the Inland Revenue (details are at
http://www.dss.gov.uk/ca/transfer.htm ). The fact that
primary legislation was involved and that a year was to pass from
announcement to implementation might appear to contradict the statement
earlier about the lack of legislative basis to agencies and their relative
flexibility. The legislation concerned is the  Social Security Contributions
(Transfer of Functions, etc.) Act 1999 and its purpose is set out in an
official Explanatory Note (available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en/1999en02.htm) .
However, the requirements for legislation have nothing to do with the
agency status of the Contributions Agency but stems from:
(a) The fact that the Inland Revenue is a non-ministerial department and
therefore (unlike transfers between ministerial departments) there is a need
to change of references to ‘the Secretary of State’ to ‘Inland Revenue’;
(b) the need for legislation to bring appeals relating to contributions under
the Commissioners of Income Tax.
The final example concerns rail regulation. In its manifesto Labour
had made clear its wish to change the regulatory framework for rail, which
was in the process of being privatised, largely through franchising. In
office, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the
regions proposed merging the existing statutory Office of Passenger Rail
Franchising (OPRAF) and the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) into a
single statutory Strategic rail authority. However, he was unable to gain
legislative time in the 1998/99 session, and legislation is unlikely to be in
place before 2000.
Overall then Next Steps agency form as such does not hinder policy
change brought in by an incoming government, though related legislative
requirements unconnected with agency status may cause delays. Where a
previous government has not used Next Steps agency form but has
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entrenched the organisational structure in legislation, or where the
incoming government itself wishes to entrench a new reorganised body,
then greater difficulties and delays may arise.
What are the implication of agencification for the debate in Britain
about joined up government?
Concern has been expressed at both political and civil service levels about
the extent to which British government is fragmented and the need for
‘holistic’ or ‘joined up’ government. (The term holistic government was
developed by Demos think tank, whose former head now works for the
Prime Minister.) Civil Servants at the very highest level have expressed
concern that agency status and the associated performance targets may
have encouraged those working in them to concentrate on the ‘vertical’
dimension of policy delivery rather than links across organisations
(information obtained at talk in December 1998 given under Chatham
House rules.) Certainly, the whole focus of framework documents
corporate plans and annual targets might seem to channel the concern of
agency management into ‘minding their own patch’, with no apparent
responsibility for the implications for other parts of government.
However, the view taken here is that while there are major problems
of lack of coordination and conflicting policies, agency form as such
makes only a minor contribution to this.
The first point to make is that many agencies have as their remit the
supply of services to other parts of government, either according to agreed
targets or on a purchasing basis.
Secondly, while most existing targets are indeed concerned with the
operations of individual agencies, there is scope for targets relating to
cooperation with other agencies. For example, for example, in 1997/98 the
Employment Service was given a target of ensuring that 90% of claims to
Job seekers Allowance were passed on to the Benefits Agency within
seven days, though this and other targets were discontinued for 1998/99
‘to focus ES efforts on key priority areas’. The problem is to define just
what areas of coordination can usefully be translated into targets.
Narrowly defined targets may by themselves do little to improve general
coordination beyond the letter of the targets.
Even before the move of the Contributions Agency to the Inland
Revenue in 1999, formal Joint Working arrangements had been set up in
1995, though clearly it was felt desirable to go beyond this.
Finally, the delivery of some programmes already involves agencies
in teamwork with a range of other governmental and non-governmental
bodies. As mentioned earlier, the Employment Service agency has taken
the lead role in the government’s New Deal programme, a term which
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itself implies that other organisations are involved. These include local
authorities and Training and Enterprise Councils.
Next Steps agencies do have the potential to exacerbate tendencies
towards ‘picket fence’ government. However, they also have the potential
to form part of cross-government cooperation through target setting or
funding which purchases services or cooperation. Agencies as such are
neither a help nor a hindrance to the endemic problems of conflicting
policies and objectives. It is worth remembering though that structured
conflict can be a way of ensuring that issues are public aired. To take two
non-agency bodies with a statutory basis the Office of Water Services
(OFWAT), a non-ministerial department, which has a remit to control
prices, regularly clashes with the Environment Agency, a non-
departmental public body, which it accuses of wanting to impose
excessively costly environmental improvement obligations.
Conclusion
Making generalisations about the relationships between politicians  and
agencies in Britain is hampered by the huge variations which exist, from
very frequent contact in a politicised atmosphere to the complete absence
of a direct relationship at all. The nature of the relationship appears to be
determined less by agency status as such as by the political sensitivity of
particular policy issues, some the result of policy issues, but others in
response to crises or developments. While politicians are not involved in
the day-to-day running of most agencies, they have been concerned with
operational matters in a small number of agencies, in part because the
distinction between policy and operational matters is not the same as the
distinction between politics and administration. While many agencies have
no direct input into policy issues (and there are few directly concerning
them), in a limited number of cases the agency is the main source of policy
advice because it is the repository of expertise, and in others the agency
has the right to be consulted about any policy proposals affecting them,
and to make policy proposals.
The British Next Steps agency form, because of it relatively
informal status, is relatively adaptable to new purposes. Thus, agency
status as such has provided little hindrance to the new Labour government.
Where difficulties have arisen is where the previous government
entrenched arrangements in statutory regulator form or where the new
Labour government wishes to entrench its own proposals in the form of a
statutory body rather than agency reorganisation. Similarly, while agencies
were originally set up and largely operate with a vertical perspective on
meeting their own targets, the form is adaptable to cross-organisational
17
targets, though it cannot solve conflicting objectives or policies. However,
considerable caution should be exercised in considering the potential
transferability of the British version of agencies (see Hogwood, 1994),
both because of the wide variation in British agencies, and because the
existence of this form very much reflects distinctive features of British
public administration.
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